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ABSTRACT
This paper examines some positive and normative aspects of the
inflation indexation of public and private pensions. The analysis shows
that alternative indexing arrangements may have far less impact onactual
patterns of risk bearing than is usually thought tobe the case. In so far
as inflation indexing has real effects, there is no presumptionthat they
are beneficial. In particular, the pre—commitment aspectsof public
indexing may not be efficient. There are sound reasons tobelieve
that voluntarily agreed on, non—indexed private pensions may wellbe
efficient. Non—indexed pensions may result in an efficient allocation
of risks given the other assets and liabilities of pension issuersand
beneficiaries. In this case, indexation would impede the efficient
allocation of risks. In this paper is also developed an ICOLI (interteinporal
cost of living index) which is superior to conventional priceindices
as a way of evaluating the changes in real well being,associated with
changes in wealth. The use of this measure has significant implications
for the indexation of pensions, and for the question of what assetsshould
be held in pension portfolios.
Lawrence H. Summers
Councilof Economic Advisers
Old Executive Office Building
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
(202) 395—5086A major issue in the design of both public and private pension plans
involves the inilexation of benefits to price level changes. A major purported
virtue of current public pensions in the United States is that they provide an
asset with a fixed rel return. This is regarded as important because of the
absence of an indexed bond market. It is frequently alleged that the failure to
provide indexed benefits is a major weakness of standard private pension
arrangements. These views have influenced the recomendations of groups such as
the President's Commission on Pension Policy (1980) and the Advisory Councilon
Social Security (1979). Both thesegroups, without detailed argument, strongly
endorse the indexation of Social Security Benefits.
Seriousconsideration of issues regarding indexation requires the careful
specificationofan alternative to indexing. It is clearly naive to suppose
thatSocial Security benefit levels would never be adjusted in the absenceof
indexation, or that real benefits would never beadjusted in the presence of
indexing. It also requires recognition of three fundamental principles of
modern finance. First, as exeiclified by the Modigliani—Miller theorem,
repackaging risk does not make it go away. Provisions which insure pension
recipients against some risks impose these same risks on the bearers of pension
liabilities. Second, risk associated with an asset cannot 'be measured in isola-
tion but depends on the covariance of its return with other economic events.
Third, the consumers' objective is to reduce total risk, not to insulate them-
selves completely from arrone source ofuncertainty.While these principles
are widely recognized, they have not informed nny previous analyses of pension
policy.
This paper examines soi positive and normative aspects of the inflation
indexation of public and private pensions. A major conclusion of the analysis
is that alternative indexing arrangements may have far less impact on actual—2.-
patternsof risk bearing than is usually thoughttobe the case. In so far as
inflation indexing has real effects, there is no presumption that they are bene—
ficial. In particular, the pre—coarnitnent aspects of public indexing may not
beefficient. There are sound reasonsto believe that voluntarily agreed
on,non—indexed private pensions may well be efficient. Non—indexed pensions
may result inan efficient allocation of risks given the other assets and liabi-
lities of pension issuers and beneficiaries. Th this case, indexation would
impede the efficient allocation of risks.
Discussions of indexation in most contexts invariably focus only on irifla—
tion indexation. The reasons for thisnarrow focus are not clear. Consumers'
objective' istominimize uncertainty about their well being not just to befree
frominflation risk. Itis certainly possible to. imagine indexing public or
private benefit levels to variables other than price indices. In this paper I
developan ICOLI (interteioral cost of living index) which is superior to con-
ventional price indices as a way of evaluating the changes in real well being,
associated with changes in wealth. The use of this measurehassignificant
implications for the indexation of pensions, and for the question of what assets
should be held in pension portfolios.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The firstsection analyzes the infla-
tion indexation of public old age pensions. Under standard assumptions of
either complete legislative discretion, or perfect capital markets, there will
be no real effects arising frora the indexation of Social Security benefits. If
enough imperfections are introduced for indexation to have real effects, there
is no presumptionthat they will bedesirable. I argue that in the context of
public pensions, indexation should be thought of primarily as a kind of real—3—
benefitcut" precorninitment. Such a precommitment canhave the perverse effect
of holding down the size of the program.
Thesecond section examines issues connectedwith the indexatiorl of private
pensions. Because of the non—coercivenature of private pensions, there are
important differences from public pensions.Again, however, it isdenonstrated
thatifcapital markets are perfect, indexationof benefits will have no real
effects. Once imperfections of a kind which permitindexing to have real
effects are introduced, it is exceedingly unlikelythat full indexing will be
optimal. Indeed, some crude empiricalcalculations suggest that fixingnominal
benefit levels may result in efficient risk sharing.
The third section of the paper extends the analysisby considering the
possibility of indexing pensions benefitsto variables other thantherate of
inflation. There appear to be other sourcesof aggregate uncertaintY whichare
of greater importance than inflation. A major sourceof uncertainty comes from
fluctiations in the real rate of return which change thepriceof future con-
sumption and so raise the sustainablestandard of living. The merits of
indexingbenefits to a price index which includes the priceoffuture consumflp—
tion are assessed. The practicality of this proposalis examined briefly.
The fourth and final section of the papersummarizes the results and exami-
nes their policy implications. A
brief discussion of Robert Merton's proposal
that Social Security benefits be indexed to agggregateconsumption concludes the
paper.—4—
I.Indexingblic_Pensions
Thissection onsiders the effects of jndexin the benefits in public pen—
sionsto the price level. Consideration of the possibility ofindexing to an
alternativeaggregate magnitude is deferred to the third section.The analysiS
here focuses on the effects of changing the size of the programin resp3flSe to
changes in the price level. The issue of indexingin the design of benefit for—
mulae is not considered.l
Since 1912, the Social Security program has in some sensebeen indexed to
the price level.2 The indexation scheme initially enacted was conceptually
flawed, and led benefits to rise much more rapidly than prices.The error was
repaired in new legislation in 1917, which has been graduallyphased in. At present,
benefits for current recipients are indexed on an annual basis.In July
ofeach year, benefits are increased by the annual rate ofCPI inflation over the
preceding 12 months. Several advisory groups includingmost recently, the
President'sCommission on Pension Policy have recorunended that the frequencyof
benefit adjustientS be increased.
Thearguments infavor of indexing the level of public pensionbenefits do
notappear to be very well developed. Theargumentseems to be that indexing
benefit levels provides insurance for beneficiaries agains.the effects of
inflation. Little attention is given to the possibilitythat this insurance can
beprovided through private financial transactions.
Frequently the consequences
ofalternative indexing arrangements for the risk characteristicsof tax liabi—
lities are not considered. Without considering these facetsof the problem, it
is impossible to evaluate the merits of indexing public pensionbenefits.
For clarity it is useful to consider the necessaryconditions for indexing
benefits to have any real effects at all. This is most easilydone recognizingC—,—
thefollowing pair of "Indexing Irrelevance Propositions" for public pensions.
psi9n IS If benefits can be adjusted continuousto desired real
leve1 4p arrangements will have no real effects on py economic variables.
Prppsit ion II. If pital markets are erfec and f yate indexed
bonds and nominal bonds exist indexip arraents will have no real efs
even if benefits can be ustedonhl
Thefirst proposition is obvious once stated. Regardless of indexing
arrangements, real benefits will be set at their desired level at each instant.
The form of indexing arrangement will affect whether benefit changes are or are
not necessary, and their magnitudes, but will have no impact on real benefit levels. -
Asimilar argument suggests that in a competitive spot labor market, indexing
in wage contracts will have no real consequences. This proposition establishes
that a necessary condition for indexation to have real effects is that benefits
can only be adjusted periodically or that some types of legislated benefit
adjustments(i.e.,real benefit cuts) are not permitted. These possibilities
areconsidered below.
Thesecond proposition is equivalent to the Modigliani-4liller theorems for
indexed bonds proved by Liviatan and Levhari (1977). It can be demonstrated as
follows. Assume that a consumer has wealth W0, which he allocates to consump-
tion and various portfolio assets in order to maximize
E U (C,WT) s.t. WTZ(l+r1)A +B (1)
where C is consumption, WT is terminal wealth, r1 is the real return on asset i,
A1 15 investment in asset i, and B represents real social security benefits
which may be uncertain. Suppose for concreteness that asset 1 is the ris)cless
indexed bond, and asset 2 is an otherwise riskiess nominal bond. Then, when—6—
benefitsare indexed, in order for them to have the same real value,the con-
dition Bnom B•eal(1+r2)/(l+rl) must hold.3 Now supposing that this condition
does hold, consider any feasible allocation (c,A) when Social Security is not
indexed. The sarie terminal wealth distribution can be obtained, if Social
Security is indexed by taking A1 =Al—Breai/(l+r),A2 2 +Breai/(1+r)
and
making no other portfolio chanes. A similar argument can be used to show that
switching from indexed to non—indexed benefits does not chance the feasible set.
It follows that indexing has no real effects under the stated conditions. The
argument could be extended to consider taxpayers' behavior and show that
indexinghas no general equilibrii effects.
Thisproposition is clearly not literally applicable to the real world
since indexed bonds do not exist. However it is an open question whether or not
portfolios ofassetswith near constant real returns can beforid.Ifso the
irrelevanceproposition here will continue to hold. Even in the absence of
indexed bonds, or the capacity to manufacture them from existing assets, indivi—
duals canundo the effects of non—indexation by borrowing to purchase real
durable assets. Thus it seems likely that at least to the extent that indivi—
duals have access to the capital markets, they can negate many of the effects of
indexingarrangements.
Thepreceding discussion demonstrates that capital market imperfections in
conjunction with rigidities in adjusting benefit levels are a
necessary condition for indexation to have real effects. We now consider the
case where individuals have no access to indexed bonds or arr close
substitute and where benefits are subject to infrequent adjustment.—7—
Indexationas Insurance
If a program can be legislatively modified onlyinfrequently,indexation
of benefits will provide insurance against unexpected developments between
legislative adjustments. The'oportanceof this insurance depends on the amount
of unexpected variation in the price level which takes place between legislative
adjustments. Table 1 reproduces a chronolor of legislative changes in Social
SecurityBenefit foruulae. It is clear from the table that benefit adjustments
are very common occuring on average every four years. It is useful to get an
ideaof how far out of line benefits can be over intervals of this length. The
likely error in forecasts of the average price level over vario1s horizons can
easily be estiizated. Forecasts based on estimates of expected inflation were
generated by applying anAFJA (i,i) processto annual rates ofCPIinflation for
thel9L7_l975 period. The root mean square forecast error rises from 1.1 per— -
centwith a one year horizon to 14.2 percent with a five year horizon. These
numbers do not suggestthat indexation mitigates an otherwise important source
ofuncertainty and mayseemsurprisingly small. Suppose however that one
-
misestirnatedthe annual inflation rate over a 5yearperiod by three percent,
theaverage error in estimates of theprice level wouldonlybeT.5percent.
Fortwo reasons, even these figures overstate the importance of any real
uncertainties generated bythenonindexation ofbenefits.First, the timing of
benefitreadjustments is endogencus. When the price level innovation is large,
adjustment of benefits can be accelerated. This means that one is unlikely to
observe large undesired changes in real benefit levels. Second, and more impor-
tantly, benefit adjustments can take account of losses or gains suffered during
thepreceding period. For simplicity assume that the target level of real
benefits is a constant B. Now assume that benefits are adjusted each period.Act
TABLE I
1977Modifiedtodistribute total crediihle wc in years
1937—50 over I —14 years. s oh 4—14 increment
cars assumed. Table in the Act (as deemed
effective fór Dccc mhcr 1978) rclaring JiB's to
PIA's frozen for workers ho attain age 62. be-
come disablcd, or die after 1978. Cost-of-living
adjustments applicable in year '.orkcr attained age
62 and after, or if carlicr, year v.orkcr hccame
disabled or died ipp1icd in December 1978 PIA's.
Effective for June /979, incrcacc of 9.9% in current
benefit levels. Effective for June 19S0, increase of
14.3% in current benefit lcvcls. Effective for June
.1981. increase of II 2% in eur,cn! benefit lesels.
I Formula applies to AMW computed for period after 1 950)
195050% of first $100 plus 15% of next $200. Effecthefor
April /932.
195255% of first $100 plus 15% of next $200. Effectivefor
September /952. increase of 12½%, but not less
than $5 in current benefit levels.
1954 55% of first SIlO plus 20% of next $240. Effectivefor
September 1954. increase of at least $5 (currcnt
benefit levels increased by approximately 13%).
(Underlying formula appearing (or
deemed to appear) jet table in the Act)
195858.85% of first SilO plus 2L40% of next $290.
Effective for January 1959, increase of the greater
of 7% or $3 in benefit level.
196562.97% of first $110 plus 22-90% of next $290 plus
2 1.40% of next $150. Effective for January 1965,
increaseof the greater of 7% or $4 in benefit level.
196771.16% of first SIlO plus 25.88% of next $290 plus
24.18% of next $150 plus 28.43% of next $100.
Effeciie for February 1968, increase of at least 13%
in benefit level.
19698 1.83% of first $110 plus 29.76% of next $290 plus
27.81% of next $150 plus 32.69% of next $100.
Effcctis'e for January 1970, increase of at least 15%
in benefit level.
197190.01% of first SI 10 plus 32.74% of next $290 plus
30.59% of next $150 plus 35.96% of next $100 plus
20% of next $100. Effective for January /971.
increase of 10% in benefit level.
1972a 108.0 1% of first SIlO plus 39.29% of next £290 plus
36.71% of next $150 plus 43.15% of next $100 plus
24% of next $100 plus 20% of next $250. Effective
for September /972. increase of 20% in benefit
level.(Provision for future automatic "cost-of-
living" increases.)
l973a 114.38% of first SilO plus 41.61% of next $290 plus
38.88% of next $150 plus 45.70% of next $100 plus
25.42% of next $100 plus 2 1.18% of next $250 plus
20% of next $50. Effective for June 1974 through
December1974 hut never applicable. Increase of
5.9% in benefit level eliminated by l973b legisla-
tion.
1973b 119.89% of first $110 plus 43.6 1% of next $290 plus
40.75% of next $150 plus 47.90% of next $100 plus
26.64% of next S lOt) plus 22.20% of next $250 plus
20% of next $100. Increase of 11% in l972a benefit
levels, effective in 2 steps: . for March-May
/974; 4% additional, for June /974. (Beginning
June 1975. subject to automatic "cost-of-living"
increase, under modification of 1972 provision.)
Pluc 20% of next $75, effeclivefor January 1975.
129.48% of first SilO plus 47.10% of next $290 plus
44.01% of next $150 plus 51.73% of next S 100 plus
Act
28.77% of next $100 plus 23.98% of next $250 plus
2 1.60% of next $175.Effective for June 1975.
increase of 8% in benefit level. Plus 20% of next
5100, effcciiiefor January 1976.
137.77% of first $110 plus 50.10% of next $290 plus
46.82% of next $150 plus 55.05% of next $100 plus
30.61% of next $100 plus 25 51% of next $250 plus
22.98% of next $175 plus 21.28% of next $100.
Effective for June i976,increaseof 6.4% in benefit
level. Plus 20% of next $100, effectise for January
1977.
145.90% of first SIlO plus 5306% of next $290 plus
49.58% of next £150 plus 58.30% of next $100 plus
32.42% of next $100 plus 27.02% of next $250 plus
24.34% of next $175 plus 22.54% of next $100 plus
21.18% of next $100.Effective for Ju,te /977,
increase of 5.9% in benefit level. Plus 20% of next
5100. effectireforfanuay /978.
155 38% of first SIlO plus 56.5 1% of next $290 plus
52.8 1% of next $150 plus 62.09% of next $100 plus
34.53% of next $100 plus 28.78% of next $250 plus
25.92% of next $175 plus 24.0 1% of next $100 plus
22.56% of next $100 plus 2 1.30% of next SlOG.
Effective for June 1978, increase of 6.5% in benefit
level.
1977For workers who attain age 62. become disabled, or
die before 1979: formula same as preceding for-
mula plus 20% of next $435. effective for January
1979.
170.76% of first $110 plus 62.10% of next $290 plus
58.04% of next $150 plus 68.24% of next $100 plus
37.95% of next $100 plus 3 1.63% of next $250 plus
28.49% of next $175 plus 26.39% of next $100 plus
24.79% of next $100 plus 23.4 1% of next $100 plus
21.98% of next $435.Effective for June 1979.
increase of 9.9% in benefit level. Plus 20% of next
$250. effeciiveforJantiaiy 1980.
195.18% of first SIlO plus 70.98% of next $290 plus
66.34% of next $150 plus 78.00% of next $100 plus
43.38% of next $100 plus 36.15% of next $250 plus
32.56% of next $175 plus 30.16% of next $100 plus
28.33% of next $100 plus 26.76% of next $100 plus
25.12% of next $435 plus 22.86% of next $250.
Effeetivefor June 1980. increase of 14.3% in ben-
efit level.Plus 20% of next $315, effective for
January /981.
2 17.04% of first SI 10 plus 78.93% of next $290 plus
73.7 7% of next $150 plus 86.74% of next $100 plus
48.24% of next $100 plus 40.20% of next $250 plus
36.21% of next $175 plus 33.54% of next $100 plus
31.50% of next $100 plus 29.76% of next $100 plus
27.93% of next $435 plus 2 5.42% of next $250 plus
22.24% of next 5315.Effective for June 198/,
increase of 11.2% in benefit level.
Formula applies to AJMEJ
1977For workers who attain age 62, become disabled, or
die in 1979: 90% of first $180 plus 32% of next $905
plus 15% of excess over $1,085.Effective for
January 1979.(Provision for future automatic
increases in bend points, $180 and $ 1.085. and for
future automatic "cost-of-living" increases after
eligibility for benefits.) Effective for June 1979.
increase of 9.9% in benefit level. Effecii'efor June
1980, increase of 14.3% in benefit level. Effective
for June 1981, increase of 11.2% in benefit level.
For worlcers attaining age 62 in 1979-83 and applying
for old-age retircmcnt benefits or dying in or after
22 Social Security Bulletin. Annurd Sttictir1 criririlemnt tO2fl—8—




T B T B (B-fl)
E =E +
1 (1+r)t1 (1+r)t(l+r)
Thatis the uncertainty in the present value of benefits received by an indivi—
dual, the second terra is (3), is much smaller than theuncertainty associated
with benefits in any given year.
Assuming that individuals have a capacity to borrow and lend at the interest
rate r, in Equation (2), the reduction in lifetirre risk due to indexing is
clearly negligable. Soire data on the financial position of the elderly are pre—
sented below. They show that most possess at least a small amount of liquid
assets. That is all that would be necessary to bufferany fluctuations in real
income due to unexpected changes in the price level. Even for individuals with
no access to the capital market, there is some marn for interteoral substi-
tutionin the timing of the purchases of durable goods.Itthus seens unlikely
thatthe length of the adjustment period constitutes any significa-t arumerit
for indexation. The data in Table 2 certainly suggest that there as been no
reduction in the variance in real benefit levels in the post 1912 -eriod when
Social Security was indexed. Admittedly this evidence is difficuL-. to interpret
because there has been an upward drift in benefit levels.
Indexation as Precornmitment -
Noneofthe foregoing discussion suggests arr large effect oa policy of
indexed benefits. Yet the issue sees tobe viewed passionatey rarTABLE 2
Ratios of PrirnaryBene1it for_Man Retiring At Age 65
At t egjnning of Various Years To Earnings
In Year Before Retirement
Low-Earnings Average-EarningsMaximum-Earnings
Year 1nddua] Individu
1953 53.5% 30.7% 28.3%
1954 51.9 29.3 28.3
1955 54.8 34.3 32.8
1956 53.8 33.5 29.6
1957 52.3 32.5 31.0
1958 50.8 31.9 31.0
1959 52.7 33.5 33.1
1960 51.8 32.8 29.8




1963 46.8 30.3 30.5
1964 46.4 29.8 30.8
1965 48.9 31.5 32.9
1966 48.1 31.3 33.2
1967 52.1 34.2 27.9
1968 49.7 32.4 28.4
1969 47.1 30.8 24.7
1970 52.2 34.3 29.2
1971 51.5 34.3 29.2
1972 52.3 34.9 33.2
1973 58.4 39.4 35.5
1974 56.3 38.3 30.5
1975 59.7 40.7 28.8
1976 60.6 42.4 31.0
1977 61.8 43.6 32.4
1978 62.1 44.4 33.4
1979 62.1 45.3 34.1
1980 64.2 47.1 29.9
Note: Earnings record for average-earnings individual is the annualized average
wage for all workers in the first quarter of the particular years. Earnings record
for low-earnings individual is $3,200 for 1974; for other years, it is the same
ratio to the earnings of the average-earnings individual as prevailed in 1974
(namely, 39.8%).
Note:The lower ratios for the average-earnings individual than for the
Inaxirnum-earnings one in 1963-66 result from the fact that, because the
maximum taxable earnings base remained unchanged in 1959-65, the former had
almost the same "final" earnings as the latter, but had significantly lower
"career" earnings.
Source: Robert J. Myers, "Summary of the Provisions of the Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance System, the: Hospital Insurance System, and the
Supplemental Medical Insurance System." Temple University, June 1980.—9--
interestgroups. One plausible explanation of howindexationcan have inortant
effectscomes from viewing itas a form of pre—cornmitaent. The governrent is
committedbecause of political constraints to maintain the level ofbenefits,
however theyare denominated. If benefits are indexed, th cannot be cut in
realterms. If not indexed, they cannot be cut in nominal terms.This distinc—
tion isfrequently cited in discussions of tax bracket indexing as well as
SocialSecurity indexing. It may be the resultofany political process in
which it is difficult to enact legislation, becausemore than a majority is
required, or the problems of consensus buildingamong diverse constituencies.
In this situation, it is possible to reduce real benefit levelsthrough infla-
tion erosion, and inaction but not through actual legislation. Thus the main
effectof indexation may be to pre—commit to a minimum fixed real benefit level.
At first, it may seem as if such a policy should be favoredby advocates of
alarger Social Security system. Indexation does prevent reductions inreal
benefitlevels through inflation. Upon reflection however, the situation is
more complex. The optiim level of real benefits legislated will in general
be lower if a constraint is imposed precluding future benefit reductions. The
nature of the ambiguity can be highlighted in the context of a highly stylized
model.
Suppose that optiiim level of benefits in period t is given by Xwhere
X is distribited uniformly on the unit interval and is serially uncorrelated.
Assume also that the regret associated with settinga benefit level B in period t is
givenby:
R(B,X) =X—Bif B<X (4)
a(B-X) ifB>X—10—
Letpolicy makers design the Social Security sche to minimize the present




Inthe case where there is no precorrimitziient problem, the optical strate is
clearly to set B5 =Xin each period and have zero regret. Note that when this
strateris followed, the mean level ofbenefits is X =.5.
Now consider the optirrEl strate when benefits can never be cut. It is
immediately obvious that it will never be desirable to set B5 >X.However it
maybe desirable to set B5 <X.This may be seen as follows. Let L(B) be the
expectedregret if the optimal strater is pursued, given that benefits are
constrained to be greater than B in all remaining periods. Then it follows imme—
• diately that if X <that the optimal strater is to set B5 =!. IfX >
theoptimal strater is to set B =orto satisfy the first order condition:
— = o (6)
ifthe value of B5 satisfying this first order condition is less than X. The
first order condition (6) states that the marginal gain from increasing benefits
in the current period, must equal the marginal cost from imposing tighter
constraints in future periods. The first order condition (6) does not provide
a basis for computing the optiuiim level of Bj,, since the form of the function
L(B) is unknown.—11—
However it is possible to characterize thestochastic steady state when the
optimal strater is pursued. This ray be done as follows. Theoptimumfeasible
strater at timesis given by somefunctionB5 =r(B5,x5)whichis clearly
monotone increasin in X5. The maxirrum attainable value ofX5 will be given by
which as shown below does not depend on B.It is clear that ultimately
the value of must approach this limit. The steady statemaythenbe charac—
terized by solving for f(Bl).
Equatjo0 (6) reveals that theoptimum choice of B* does not depend on B.
It can be solved easily in this case. SuppDse f(B,l) =B*.Then inallfuture
periodsB =B*.If X <B*,the "no—cut constraint" insures this equality.
If X >Btthe equality is insured by the nonotonicity of the function f(B,x).
This means that itiseasy to evaluate f(B*). It is given by:
t rR(B*)1
(7) 0
Differentiating ()andusing (6) yields the first order condition:
1 - (B*(1+a)a)= (8)
Itfollows that B* is given by:
B* = + () (l+a) l+a
Several inferences can be drawn from equation (9). Note first thesteady
state level of benefits B* can be greater or less than theexpected benefit level
when fulldiscretionis maintained. Bychoosingappropriate parameter values
in (9)anylevel of B maybefound to be optixial. As the value of the discount
factor 13, increases, the level of benefits declines. This is becausewhen the—12—
futurecounts morehighly, the cost of constraining one's policychoices is
moresevere. As one would expect, increases in the value of a also reduce the
steady state value of B.
The stylized model here illustrates an obvious principle that cutting off
one's options is undesirable, and a more subtle one that irposing a "no—cut"
constraint on a prorain ray reduce its exjected funding level. Obviously, the
model would acco;aodate a number of extensions.But itseemsunlikely that these
qualitative results would be upset by introducing factors such asanupward
drift in the expected desired level offundingX5or allowingit to be serially
correlated.
It isdifficultto assess the relevance of the effects stressed here.
Certainly the current policy debate on Social Security rakes itplausiblethat
the program would be cut in real terms, if thiswere possible without legisla-
tive action. This suggests the importance of the pre—comit:ent aspect of
indexation stressed here. The failure of Congress to rescind double indexing's
effects strongly supports the importance of pre—cornnitment effects. Whether or
not "no cut" comrriitmentshave the restraining effects on spending suggested here
ismoreproblematic.—13—
II.InflatiorIndexationand_Private_Pensions
There are at least two important indexatiori issues in connection i.ith
definedbenefit private pensions. First, there is the question of indexing
benefits for persons who are alreadyretired.At the present time, most private
pensions in theUnited States provide beneficiaries with level noidnal
annuities. While adjustmentsare sometimes made for the effects of inflation,
theseare rare and relatively small. A second issue is in the calculation of
benefits. At present, in most plans, workers' vested benefits area fraction
whichdepends on years of service and their current salaries. Actualbenefits
receivedfrom a firm depend on a worker's final year salary at that firm. These
two aspects of pension indexation are considered separately below.
Indexedetirement Benefits
It is widely believed that private pensions shouldofferindexed retireiient
benefits. For example, the President's Commission on Pension Policy (1980)
•••encouragesprivate and state and local pension plans to provide some form
of inflation protection for retirees." The failure ofprivate pensions to offer
indexed options is a puzzle. Feldstein (1981)suggests the developcient °'
indexedpensions would nothave been desirable because workers already had a
substantialdegree of inflation protection from Social Security. His analysis
assumes that the capital market coiensates individuals for bearing inflation
risk. The basis for this supposition is not at all clear. Both the issuers
and holders of nominal instruments bear risk from inflation uncertainty. There
isno obvious reason why the holders rather than issuers of nominal instruments
should be compensated for bearing this risk. Indeed, the fact that mean—1)4 —
realizedreturnsbonds and bills have been essentially zero over the last 50
years tends to suggest that the capital market does not compensateindividuals
for 'bearinginflation i-isk.
Atthe outset, it is useful to consider as a benchmark the special case of
a perfect capital market, inthe presence ofa safe real asset, and unchanging
opportunitysets for investors. In thiscase all individuals in equilibrium
willhold some combination ofthesafe asset and the market portfolio. There is
nooptical degree of pension indexing; any form of pension asset is as good as any
other. If a firm issues safe real pensions, it will find that its shareholders
hedge by purchasing the safe asset. Its pension beneficiaries drawdown their
holdings of the safe asset and switch their portfolios towards more risky
assets.The form of the pension 'benefit is a ritter of irrelevance. This
theorem can clearly beproven under much more general assumptions,similar to
thosethat have 'been used to provide proofsof the gener1ized odigliani-44iller
theorems.In order to find arr effects of alternative indexing arrangements,it
isnecessary to introduce some capital marketimperfections.
The natural imperfection to introduce is a restriction on short sales.This
has at least two potentially important effects. First, it may be impossiblefor
individuals to undo theeffects of their pension plan. Ingeneral, this would
requiredrawing do.rnor selling short their assets held by their pensionfunds.
This consideration, taken'by itself would tend to suggest that efficient private
pension arrahgenients would make benefit levels contingent onthe returns on
widely traded assets. Second, in general itwillbe iiiossible for all indivi-
duals to hold the market portfolio. Because of moral hazards, individuals are
likely to be locked into holding much more of their wealth in theform of their
own homes and human capital, than would be included in fullydiversifiedport——15--
folios. This suggests that they would prefer theirpension assets to have
returns that are negatively correlated with the returnson assets that they are
locked into holding.
-
Hurdand Shoven (1982) assess the vulnerability of theportfolio of assets
held by the elderly to the effects of inflation.They conclude +.hat even when
nominalpensions are included, the aged are for the most part well hedged
against unexpected inflation. It is likely that their results understate the
extent to which the aged are protected from inflation. Avery sizable fraction
of the wealth of the aged isrepresented by the gross value of their homes.
Botheconomictheory and empirical evidence, (Sumrers (198la,)poterba (1981))
suggestthat owner occupied housing prices should rise much more thanpoint for
point with unexpected inflation. This inference is supported by the recent
sharp decline in real house prices.
These factors suggest that nominal pension liabilitiesmay in fact reduce
the real uncertainties associated with the wealth position of the aged. Of
course efficient pension arrar€emnt cannot be discussed without also con-
sidering the risks borne by corporate shareowners. This aspect of the problem
is considered below, after a discussion of the role of indexation in vesting
provisions.
Indexed Vesting Provisions
Bulow (1982) has made theimportant observation that ina competitivelabor
market a worker's marginal product in each period should equal the sum of his
wage and his accrual of vested pension benefits. More generally, his argument
suggests thatsome set of market forces determine an optimal time path for com-
pensatiori. This optimal compensation path will in general be independent
of what pension arrangements are made. If pension benefits are vested in nomi—-16—
nal terms, they represent a nominal asset to workers, and nominal liability to
firms. If the rate of inflation rises, the value of the worker's already
accrued pension asset declines. There is no reason why this should be asso—
ciated with higher subsequent compensation anymore than one would expect
workers' coiripensation to be increased just because other parts of their port-
folio performed 'badly.
The common argument that pensions are effectively indexed during the
accrual phase, because benefits are tied to final year salaries, is as Bulow
points out, wrong. It ignores the fact that wages and pension accruals are
determined jointly. Market forces determine a path of total corupensation not a
path of waes. If inflation increases, and pension rules remain static, so that
the rate of growth of pension accruals increases, the rate of wage growth will
decline.
Thus under current institutional arrangents, pension wealth is a nominal
asset for all workers, not just those who have already retired. At current
high rates.of interest, the value of the asset is likely to 'be small for most
young workers. As just emphasized we should not expect the non—indexation of
vested benefits to have any effect on the path of compensation. Hence there is
noreason to expect that indexing pensions would have ar effectson patterns of
labor turnover or allocative efficiency. Again by the same arguments made
above, in a perfect capital market indexation would have no real effects.
Table3 presents some evidence on the balance sheets of different age
groups.The data su,ggest that the younger part ofthe population is likely to
be even better hedged against inflation than the aged. This inference is
strengthened by the observation that the "net hoire" iteu in Table 3 is likely toTABLE 3
Composition of Wealth by Age Group
December_31, 1962




Total 100 100 100 100
Net home 31 33 25 22
Automobile 5 4 2 1
Business 23 23 20 12
Liquid assets 10 11 13 16
Investment assets 22 26 38 47
Miscellaneous assets 9 3 2 1
Source.--Dorothy S. Projector and Gertrude S. Weiss, Survey_of Financial
Characteristics of Consumers (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, August, 1966).—17--
involvemuch more offsetting gross ho::e value and mort.age debt for younger
households. This implies that the provision of nominal pensions is unlikely to
impose serious risks on young workers.
Risk_Bear inyrms
The question which remains to be examined is the impact of alternative pension
irdexing arranerents on the risks borne by the u1tirate cwners of pension
liabilities. The proximate owners are corporation. The ultiate owners are
mainly corporate shareowners, but also other corporate creditors, and taxpayers
through the PBGC. Given capital market imperfections, it is reasonable to
expect that corporate s'nareowners will be less well hedged against inflation
thanwill pension beneficiaries. Data in Blume, Crockett and Friend (19714) con-
firm that ownership ofcorporate stock is concentrated anng the very affluent. Hurd
and Shoven report that inflation vulnerability increases with affluence. This
inferenceis strongly confirid bythe data in Table 4 on the composition of
wealthby income class. Theshareof liquidassets and investnent assets
(mainly stocks and bonds) rises sharply with income.
The same point may be made more directly. Despite the fact that pension
liabilities are nominal, corporate equity returns are systematically negatively
related to unexpected inflation. In Summers (1981b) I sho, that this is quite
consistent with rationality on the part of investors. A one percent increase in
the permanent rate of expected inflation is estimated to reduce the present
value of real cash flows to shareholders by 3.146percent,due to tax effects.
This calculation does not take arv accountof pension obligations. Since in
most cases pension plans are overfunded, takingaccount of pensionassets and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































offered indexed pensions, the negative effect would be increased still further.
The discussion in this section suests that the failure of the private
market todevelop inflation indexed pensions is not surprising.In a perfect
capital market, indexation arraneitnts would have no real effects. If capital
marketsare imperfect, one would expect arrangements to evolve which lead to the
sharing of otherwise undiversifiable risks. The holders of pension assets
appearto be positioned so that they gainfrom unexpected inflation. Thecor—
porationswhich issue pension liabiities appear because of a non—irdexed tax
systemto be in the position of nominal creditors. Thismeansthat efficient
risk sharing calls for the issuance of nominal pension liabilities. It is
interesting to note that similar considerations can explain why indexed bonds
have not been issued.—19--
I II. In exinto Other rates
Almost all p-actically oriented discussions of indexation focuson indexing
benefits to the general price level. The motivationfor this choice is rarely
clearly specified.The implicit argument for price level indexationseentobe
that this provides full insurance because real benefitlevels are guaranteed.
To state this arguinnt is to realize itslimitatIons. Presumably, we care about
the real standard of living of pension and SocialSecurity beneficiaries, rather
than their benefit levels from theprograrrs. Only for individuals wholly sup-
ported by a given nonadjustableprogram is there a potential argument for
inflation indexation of benefit levels. The discussion in theprecedin section
made the point that insuring program benefit levelsmay actually increase the
risk borne by beneficiaries if benefits wouldotherwisehave covaried negative-
ly with the assets in beneficiaries' portfolios.
Thisraises the more general point, that ifthe goal is to provide
insuranceto beneficiaries, it will in general be desirable to link changes in
benefits to changes in the opportunity set facedby consumers. Benefits should
be varied so as to play the role of the hedgeportfolios in Merton's (1913)
IntertemporalCapital Asset Pricing Model. Of course, the qualifications
suggested in preceding sections abcxit whether indexing can haveany real effects
apply equally in this context. Similarly the cost ofar insurance is that the
insuredrisksare foisted on the holders of pension liabilities.
Thesepoints maybeillustrated in a more formal way. Consider the problem
of the representative aged consumer. Forsimplicity, I assume that the horizon
is known with certainty, and that futureprices are known with certainty, so
that there exists a safe real asset. The consumer'sprobln is to:-20—
T1 T Max / U()eSt)ds s.t. A + f B e _i(s_t)dS Ipce_i_t)ds(10) tt S t SS
where A representsassets, B represents benefits, and i is the nominalinterest
rate. This problemgives rise toan indirect utility function of the form:
U =V(At,j,pt•.••PT,....) (11)
Itis not difficult to verify that the •indirect utility function (II)is hoinoge—
neousof degree 0 in A and the vectors P and B. If for simplicity itis




where iisthe rate of inflation and the lower case values of B representreal
benefit levels. It is inrnediately apparent from (12) that chances in the rate
of inflation will not affect the attainable level of utility only if(i) they do
not affect real benefit levels, Bt, (ii) thej leave the real interest rate t —
Itt,unaffected and (iii) they have no effect on real wealth. Conventional
indexing schemes are directed at insuring that the first of theseconditions is
met. The discussion in the preceding section considered the implicationsof the
fact that (iii)is unlikely to be satisfied. The analysis here howeversuggests
that indexing if it is to insure beneficiaries' standard of living musttake
account of all changes in real wealth, and in the real interest rate.
The effect of changes in the realinterestrate is of particular interest.—21--
Conventional price indices trytomeasurethechange from period to period in
the cost of attaining some level of utility. Norm.lly, this is done by finding
the change in the purchase price of a fixed bundle of goods. The logic of this
procedure is not clear once one recognizes that consumers "spendt' most of their
incomeon future consumption. If the price of a washing machine goes down a
consumer is usually though better off. Has he not also gained if the price in
terms of today's dollars ofthebundle he plans to buy next period goes down?
Thissuggeststhat in evaluating the welfare of the aged some sort of inter—
temporal price index should be emplqred.
There is another way of looking at the problem which leads to a similar
conclusion. Consider an indivióial who desires a constant real consumption
stream, and holds all his wealth in the form of an indexed real annuity. Such
an individual is exposed to no real risk since his annuity payments exactly
match his consumption streams However if' real interest rates fluctuate, the
market value of such a real annuity will vary. The asset will appear risky when
risk is measurable in the standard way. This paradox is easily resolved. When
realinterest rates rise, the value of the annuity declines and the price of
future consumption also falls. The value of the annuity measured relative to a
proper interterrrporal cost of living index (as described below) remains con-
stant. Notice that the same analysis could be applied to the situation of'an
individualwho ownshis home which fluctuates in value as the real interest rate
changes.
POllak(1975) shows how the standard theoryofcost of living indicies can
beextendedto intertemporal case. The goal here is more modest. Inan effort
toillustrate the potential importance of changes in the real interest rate, I—22—
calculatealtrr]ative estii:ates of a Laspyres intertetporal cost of living
index. The assumed market basket is a constant stream of real consumption over
a 10 year period. The purchase price of such a real annuity Is given by:
Pt(lt) (13) =
wherert is the real interest rate at time t, and T is the annuity horizon. The
changein the interteinporal cost of living index is given by:
_rT
p =O/ p+ o (14)
A t rt
Thefirst term in (14 )correspondsto the ordinary inflation rate. The second
corresponds to the change in the price offuture consumption.
Themajor problex.a in esticating the intertcnpora1 price index given in
(13 )ismeasuring the long term real interest rate.In the enirical work
reportedbelow, the actual ex-post rates ofinflation were used in calculating
thelong term real interest rate. For periods after 1981, when actual Inflation
data were unavailable, expected inflation as measured in the Livingston Survey
was used. This data Is described In Carison (1977).Obvioxsly,the use of such
a perfect foresight inflation measure is somewhat problematic. Preliminary
investigations using the econometric measures of expected inflation developed
In Sunirs (1981a) reached qualitatively similar conclusions.
Estimates of the percentage change in the interteioral cost of living
indexare shown inTable 5alongwith the rate of CPI inflation. It is clear
thatmovementsin real interest rates are an important element affecting the
interteraporal index. In the three yearswhen CPI inflation wasgreatest, l971,





























Note: Calculationsdescribed in text. Year]y values were calculated on a
December to December basis.—23—
was because tbe sharp increases in real interest rates reduced the price of
future consurption. Increasing real interest rates contributed —7.1% inl97,
J4.7%in 1918, and —6.%in1979 to the interteinporal inflation rate. Overall,
the correlation between the rate of inflation as measured using the standard
CPI,andas measured using the interteuporal index was only .5.
Thesecrude calculations indicate the importance of aggregate factors
other than the price level which ::ay affect corsumers' well being.
It is important to be clear abot the letate uses of an intertemporal
price index like the one developed here. The index provides a correct basis for
assessin the change in welfare for a given change in prices and interest rates
for an individual who has no future income streams. Even here there is a small
problem unless individuals are infinite lived, since the length oftheirhorizon
ischanging. The more serious issue involves future incoies. It would be
appropriate to compare the present value of future incomes to the price index
developedhere.It shouldbe clear that in sucha calculation, the effects ofa
change in the interest rate on the present value of future streams, and on the
priceof future consumption would workin opposite directions. The adjustments
underconsideration will be important only when the duration of the individual's
futureconsumption and income streams differ siiificantly. The data in Hurd
arid Shoven (1982) suggest that only about half of the wealth of the "young aged"
is in the form of future streams of income. This suggests that the price index
considered here is likely to be very relevant to assessing their well being.
Once one conterx1ates the possibility of indexing benefits to a price index
of this general type, other possibilities suggest themselves. Why not also
index benefits to changes in real wealth which also change the opportunity set,or to developients which affect future incoJe? Efforts to integrateprivate
pensions and Social Security represent one small step in this direction. Such
indexingschemes of córse involve the same issues of discretion and capital
market behavior. It doesseem clear however that there is no strong logic which
suppDrtsindexation of benefits to the current price level as against other
alternatives.
A second implication of these results is that in iriakingportfolio choices
theagedshould be concerned about real returns relative to an intertnporal
price index like that considered here. Assets should be more highly valued if
their returns are positively correlated vith the price of future consumption.-25—
Iv. r-)clusio
Theanalysis in this paper supports three principal conclusions: First,
indexationof both public and private pensions is likely to haveonlyminor
effects on real economic behavior. The presence of provisions for discretionary
adjustment, and the workings of capital markets, suggest that indexation provi-
sions will be largely neutralized by other offsetting adjustments.
Second,the effects ofincreased indexatiori may well be perverse. The pre—
commitmentaspect of public indexing means that the ultirate effect of indexing
provisions may be to reduce the size of public pensions. The non—indexation of
private pensions probably represents efficient risk sharifl. It appears that
pension beneficiaries are much better hedged against inflation risks than are
the bearers of pension liabilities.
Third, if insurance is the motivation for indexation proVisiOnS, there is no
reason why such provisions should be confined to inflation. Only under very
restrictive assumptions will inflation indexing provide full insurance. In par—
ticular an important source of exogenous uncertainty facing the aged involves
the price of future consumption. Changes in an estited interteiora1 cost of
living index diverge significantly from those in the conventional CPI.
PobertMerton, in his contribution to this volume advocates a novel solu-
tiontosome of the problems discussed here. He proposes that Social Security
benefits be indexed to the level of aggregate consumption. He argues that in
addition to providing inflation protection, such a plan would offer a form of
"standard of living" insurance. Ingeneral, the level ofconsumption is likely
to be a proxy for the opportunity set facing consumers. This notion is
justified formally in Merton (l9T3) and Breeden (1979).erton's proposed Social Security plan is self financing and requires only
veryinfrequent adjustzrient. The self financing character of the plan reduces
substantially the precor-nitment problems stressed here. !erton's indexing
schemeprovides for bothincreasesanddecreases in benefit levels, so the "no
cut" constraint is unlikely to bind. It also implicitly Trakes benefit levels
depend on both the level of '.ealth and real rates of return.
There are however a number of types of shocks which are likely to affect
real consumption but not optimal benefit levels. Triese include changes in the taste
for leisure, changes in demographic compositionofthe population, changes in
lifeexpectancy, and changes in the distribution of income. The Lportance of
these shocks relative to others causing fluctuations in aggreate consumption is
an empirical question. If they are significant, it may be preferable to desii
indicesbased on estiriated changes in the opportunity set of the representative
aged consumer. The interteiporal cost of living index presented here represents
astart in this direction.-27—
Footnotes
1. Indexing in the desi&n of the benefit formula may well cause greater
horizontal equity.
2. While the discussion here focuses on Social Security, it is clearly appli-
cable to other public pensions such as those for Veterans and federal ei.lajees.
3. This condition is necessary. In order to meaninful1y talk about the
effects of indexation it must be assumed that benefit pac).'ages have equal value
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